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Abstract
Today, Internet traffic is encrypted only when deemed
necessary. Yet modern CPUs could feasibly encrypt most
traffic. Moreover, the cost of doing so will only drop
over time. Tcpcrypt is a TCP extension designed to make
end-to-end encryption of TCP traffic the default, not the
exception. To facilitate adoption tcpcrypt provides back-
wards compatibility with legacy TCP stacks and middle-
boxes. Because it is implemented in the transport layer,
it protects legacy applications. However, it also provides
a hook for integration with application-layer authentica-
tion, largely obviating the need for applications to en-
crypt their own network traffic and minimizing the need
for duplication of functionality. Finally, tcpcrypt mini-
mizes the cost of key negotiation on servers; a server us-
ing tcpcrypt can accept connections at 36 times the rate
achieved using SSL.
1 Introduction
Why is the vast majority of traffic on the Internet not en-
crypted end-to-end? The potential benefits to end-users
are obvious—improved privacy, reduced risk of sensitive
information leaking, and greatly reduced ability by op-
pressive regimes or rogue ISPs to monitor all traffic with-
out being detected. In spite of this, end-to-end encryption
is generally used only when deemed necessary, a small
fraction of when it would be feasible.
Possible reasons for not encrypting traffic1 include:
• Users don’t care.
• Configuration is complicated and the payoff small
(especially when connecting to unknown sites).
• Application writers have no motivation.
1Conspiracy theorists might suggest other reasons, but we won’t
discuss those here.
• Encryption (and key bootstrap) are too expensive to
perform for all but critical traffic.
• The standard protocol solutions are a poor match for
the problem.
We believe that each of these points either is not true,
or can be directly addressed with well-established tech-
niques. For instance, where users actually have con-
trol, they demonstrate that they do care about encryp-
tion. Four years ago only around half of WiFi basesta-
tions used any form of encryption [3]. Today it is rare to
find an open basestation, other than ones which charge
for Internet access.
It is clear, though, that application writers have lit-
tle motivation: encryption rarely makes a difference to
whether an application succeeds. Getting it right is diffi-
cult and time consuming, doesn’t help time to market,
and developers are hard-pressed to make the business
case. For server operators, too, the process can be te-
dious. One reason people don’t use SSL is that X.509
certificates are a mild pain both for the server administra-
tor and, if the server administrator didn’t buy a certificate
from a well-known root CA, for users.
Even more important is the performance question.
SSL is by far the most commonly deployed crypto-
graphic solution, and it is expensive to deploy on servers.
Where there is a need, such as for bank login or credit
card payments, SSL is ubiquitous, but it is rarely used
outside of web pages that are especially sensitive. The
definition of “sensitive” has started to change, though;
Google recently enabled SSL on all Gmail connec-
tions [25], ostensibly as a response to eavesdropping
in China. In part this is possible today because cryp-
tographic hardware has become comparatively inexpen-
sive. This trend is set to continue; the most recent gen-
eration of Intel CPUs incorporate AES acceleration in-
structions [8], with the potential to significantly reduce
the cost of software symmetric-key encryption.
Although symmetric-key encryption is unlikely to be
a problem, the conventional wisdom is still that it is too
expensive to use public-key cryptography to bootstrap
a session key for all network connections. Indeed our
measurements show that a fully loaded eight-core (2 x
Quad-core Xeon X5355) server can only establish 754
uncached SSL connections per second. In fact, this lim-
itation is due to the way SSL uses public key algorithms
rather than anything fundamental. We will show that
much better server performance is possible with the right
protocol design, in part by pushing costs to the client,
which does not need to handle high connection rates.
Finally, there is the question of whether current en-
cryption protocols are a sufficiently good match for ap-
plications that do not currently use encryption. We be-
lieve they are not, for reasons we shall highlight through-
out the paper. However, we will describe a subtly differ-
ent protocol architecture that we believe is a much better
fit to the majority of applications. This is not rocket sci-
ence; it may even be considered obvious. But we believe
it makes a huge difference to the deployability of encryp-
tion and consequently of authentication in the real world.
1.1 Getting the Architecture Right
All the commonly deployed network encryption mecha-
nisms incorporate authentication into the protocol, even
if, like WPA, it is as simple as requiring out-of-band
password exchange. Indeed this is the obvious way to
engineer things; without authentication, it is not possible
to determine if your encrypted channel is with the desired
party or with a man-in-the-middle. However, we believe
that this is fundamentally the wrong design choice.
Encryption of a network connection is a general pur-
pose primitive; regardless of the application, the goal
is to prevent eavesdroppers from learning the contents
of communications. MACing of packets in a network
connection is also a general purpose primitive; no ap-
plication wants to accept forged or maliciously modi-
fied packets. Authentication, however, is not general
purpose. The mechanism used for authentication and
the information needed to perform that authentication
are application-specific. In practice, protocols blur this
distinction between general purpose encryption/integrity
and special purpose authentication. This has two conse-
quences:
• It tends to encourage inappropriate authentication
mechanisms. For example, using SSL to connect to
a bank, then simply handing the user’s password to
the bank, when it is known that people commonly
re-use passwords across sites.
• It makes it hard to integrate mechanisms low
enough in the protocol stack to really be ubiqui-
tous. For example, adding SSL to an application re-
quires modifying the source code and, potentially,
extending its application-layer protocol in a back-
wards compatible way.
To enable encryption and integrity checking in a gen-
eral way for all legacy TCP applications2, this function-
ality must be below the application layer. However it
cannot be done cleanly any lower than the transport layer
because this is the lowest place in the stack that has any
concept of a conversation. There is also the practical
consideration that encrypting below the transport layer
will prevent NAT traversal. The clear implication is that
embedding encryption and integrity protection into TCP
would provide the right general-purpose mechanism; in
fact, because TCP includes a session establishment hand-
shake, this is simple to do in a backward-compatible way.
To establish session keys in a general way, TCP-level
encryption should be divorced from higher level authen-
tication mechanisms. This suggests the use of ephemeral
public keys to establish session keys. Such a mechanism,
enabled by default, would provide protection against pas-
sive eavesdroppers for all TCP sessions, even for legacy
applications. We are not the first to suggest such “op-
portunistic” encryption. Our goal, though, is to provide
not just encryption and integrity protection, but also a
firm foundation upon which higher-level authentication
mechanisms can build. With the right architecture, a di-
verse set of authentication mechanisms can be devised,
each suitable to its own application.
The end point we hope to establish is that all TCP ses-
sions (and SCTP and DCCP, though we don’t discuss
these further here) are protected against passive eaves-
droppers, and that all applications that require authenti-
cation should, as a side effect, enjoy protection against
active man-in-the-middle attacks, all without duplica-
tion of effort. Ideally, an eavesdropper cannot tell from
watching the traffic which encrypted sessions will be au-
thenticated.
In this paper, we describe tcpcrypt, our implemen-
tation of TCP-level encryption. Although the idea is
simple, the details really matter, as we will show. We
have validated our design by building two implemen-
tations, one a Linux kernel module, the other a user-
space process using divert sockets. The latter allows
use of tcpcrypt on Linux, FreeBSD, and MacOS X with-
out modifying the kernel. Both implementations show
excellent performance; we will demonstrate that this is
no longer the factor preventing ubiquitous network en-
cryption. We have also implemented application-level
authentication protocols that use tcpcrypt to bootstrap
authentication. These include X.509 certificate-based
authentication, fast password-based mutual authentica-
tion, and PAKE. Our X.509-based authentication pro-
2The vast majority of Internet applications use TCP.
vides security equivalent to SSL, but uses batch-signing
to run 25 times faster. Moreover, we have implemented
X.509 authentication inside the OpenSSL library in a
way that preserves the same API and cleanly falls back to
vanilla SSL when appropriate. Thus, to take advantage
of tcpcrypt in SSL-enabled applications requires only a
library update.
2 Cryptographic design
The goal of tcpcrypt is to enable the best communica-
tions security possible under a wide range of circum-
stances. In the absence of any authentication, when users
browse unknown servers, they should enjoy protection
from passive eavesdropping. Though active network at-
tackers may still intercept and monitor communications
(there are also legitimate reasons for this, such as trans-
parent proxies and intrusion detection systems), it should
be possible to detect such behavior both during commu-
nications and afterward. Thus, tcpcrypt should virtu-
ally eliminate the possibility of widespread eavesdrop-
ping unbeknownst to a user population.
When an application performs any kind of endpoint
authentication, it must be able to leverage tcpcrypt to
obtain stronger protection of session data. For instance,
given a server-side X.509 certificate, the client should be
assured of the confidentiality of the data it transmits and
the integrity of the data it receives. Any time a user types
a password, it should be possible to ensure the confiden-
tiality and integrity of all data sent in either direction.
In all cases, when tcpcrypt achieves confidentiality, it
should also provide forward secrecy. As a final goal,
tcpcrypt should affect performance as little as possible.
Thus, the protocol is designed to minimize the number of
cryptographic operations and extra round trips, subject to
the limitations of needing to interoperate with legacy end
hosts and middleboxes.
2.1 Key exchange protocol
Key exchange is the biggest challenge to tcpcrypt’s per-
formance. Forward secrecy requires a pair of hosts to ex-
change a secret using an ephemeral public key or Diffie-
Hellman key exchange the first time they communicate.
These operations are far more costly than establishing a
TCP connection, but the cost can be asymmetric. For
example, a single core of the server in Section 6 can per-
form 12,243 encryptions/sec with a 2,048-bit RSA-3 key,
but only 97 decryptions/sec.
Servers typically communicate with more peers than
clients do, so it makes sense for clients to shoulder most
of the cost of key exchange. Thus, by default, tcpcrypt
performs the expensive decryption at the client (though
for generality, servers may opt to reverse the protocol).
HELLO - syn
PKCONF - s
yn ack
INIT1 - ack
INIT2 - ack
encryption start
NEXTK1 - syn
NEXTK2 - s
yn ack
encryption start
ack
Figure 1: Tcpcrypt connection establishment with key
exchange (left) and session caching (right).
Subsequent connections between the same two hosts can
use session caching to avoid any public key operations
at all, thereby ensuring that, for instance, an active-mode
FTP server need not perform RSA decryptions.
The initial key exchange works as follows. Each ma-
chine C has an ephemeral public key,KC . When C con-
nects to a server S for the first time, C chooses a random
nonce, NC ; S chooses a random secret, NS ; the two ex-
change the following messages, also shown in Figure 1:
C → S : HELLO
S → C : PKCONF, pub-cipher-list, [cookie]
C → S : INIT1, sym-cipher-list, NC ,KC , [cookie]
S → C : INIT2, sym-cipher, ENCRYPT (KC , NS)
Here pub- and sym-cipher-list are used to negotiate cryp-
tographic algorithms. The optional cookie is a SYN-
cookie that must be echoed by the client to make it harder
for packets from forged source addresses to trigger any
public-key cryptographic operations in the server. This
trade-off is at the discretion of the server; if TCP’s 32-
bit initial sequence number (ISN) provides enough pro-
tection against forged packets, the option space may be
deemed better used for other purposes.
KC specifies the public key cipher and a pseudo-
random function, used below. Quantities from this pro-
tocol are then combined into a series of “session secrets”
with a Collision-resistant Pseudo-random Function, CPF
(currently HMAC):
ss[0]← CPF
(
NS ,
{
KC , NC ,
cipher-lists, sym-cipher
})
ss[i]← CPF (ss[i− 1], TAG NEXT KEY)
If ISNC,i and ISNS,i are TCP’s initial sequence numbers
on the client and server for session i, the two sides then
compute a master secret as follows:
mk[i]← CPF (ss[i], {TAG KEY, ISNC,i, ISNS,i}) .
Finally, the two sides use CPF(mk[i], x) on various con-
stants x to generate encryption and MAC keys (a com-
mon technique). From this point on, all further segments
in the TCP connection are cryptographically protected.
Note that this full key exchange is only needed for the
first connection between two hosts. Hosts can cache ss[i]
for the largest i used till that point. Subsequent connec-
tions between the same two hosts can use this to derive
new symmetric keys, thereby avoiding any further public
key cryptography and the latency of the full handshake.
2.2 Authentication Hooks
To gain stronger benefits from tcpcrypt, applications
must be able to make statements about a connection—
e.g., “All data you read from this connection is sent by
user U’s browser,” or “Any data you write to this connec-
tion can be decrypted only by server Y.” To make such
statements, one must specify what is meant by “this con-
nection” in a way that cannot be interpreted out of con-
text. Tcpcrypt accomplishes this through session IDs. A
new getsockopt call returns a session ID, sid[i], computed
from the connection’s session secret ss[i] as follows:
sid[i]← CPF (ss[i], TAG SESSION ID)
If both ends of a tcpcrypt connection see the same
session ID, then with overwhelming probability an at-
tacker cannot eavesdrop on or undetectably tamper with
traffic—i.e., there has not been a man-in-the-middle at-
tack. Two properties facilitate verification of session IDs.
First, they need not be kept secret. Second, with over-
whelming probability they are unique over all time, even
if one end of a connection is malicious. Hence, a crypto-
graphically endorsed session ID can only ever authenti-
cate a single tcpcrypt connection. In Section 4 we discuss
different ways applications can leverage session IDs.
2.3 Proof of Security
To increase confidence in tcpcrypt, we provide a semi-
formal proof of its security. We assume that the adver-
sary has complete control over the network, and nearly
complete control over the users. It can choose when and
to whom users attempt to connect, and what data they
send, and can delay, drop, modify, and forge packets ar-
bitrarily. Furthermore, since the session IDs sid[i] are
not secret, we assume that the adversary knows them.
We do not model malicious machines here, as the ad-
versary can emulate as many of these as it wants. We
do not model compromised machines because of space
constraints. When we write “client” or “server” in this
discussion, we mean a legitimate client or server.
We guarantee the security of tcpcrypt connections only
when the session IDs match. In this case, the guarantee
is fairly strong:
Definition 2.1 (Security guarantees). Suppose that users
U1 and U2 complete the tcpcrypt protocol on sockets S1
and S2, and arrive at sessions with the same session ID.
Then the following guarantees hold:
• The adversary has not tampered with U1 and U2’s
cipher suite choices. Assuming they have chosen a
secure cipher suite:
• Any packet sent by U1 on socket S1 (or by U2 on S2)
gives no information to the adversary other than its
length and timing.
• If, after TCP reassembly, U2 receives a sequence of
segments p1, . . . , pn, then U1 sent those segments
in that order (and no segments before them), and
similarly for segments received by U1.
We will show that, unless the adversary has broken
the underlying cryptographic primitives, its probability
of violating this guarantee is very small. Specifically:
Theorem 2.1 (Security of tcpcrypt). Suppose that an ad-
versary A can violate the tcpcrypt security guarantee
with probability ǫ. Suppose that it usesm machines in its
attack, and begins at most c connections in total. Then
there are five simple modifications ofA, running in about
the same time asA, which aim to do the following things:
• Find a collision in CPF.
• Break the pseudorandomness of CPF.
• Break the public-key cipher.
• Break the MAC.
• Break the symmetric cipher.
The sum of their probabilities of success is at least
ǫ− 3c2/2k+1
where k ≈ 256 is the minimum of the min-entropy of a
public key, or the length in bits of NS or NC .
Proof. Define NEXT(k) := CPF(k, TAG NEXT KEY).
Suppose that U1 and U2 have the same sid, and that for
U1 it is sid[i] for some i, where:
ss[0] = CPF (NS , {KC , NC , cipher-lists, sym-cipher})
sid[i] = CPF
(
NEXT
i(ss[0]), TAG SESSION ID
)
Because everything passed to CPF has a unique parse, the
sid must have been computed by U2 in the same way—
and in particular with the same values of NS , NC ,KC ,
the same cipher suite lists and the same cipher choice—
or else the computation contains a hash collision. What is
more, theNS , NC , andKC values are chosen at random,
and so with probability at least 1 − 3c2/2k+1 they are
unique. For the rest of the proof, assume that this is the
case.
Now, each of U1 and U2 is either a client or a server.
Because their KC , NC and NS values match, they can’t
both be clients or both be servers; without loss of gener-
ality, say U1 is the client (which generatedKC andNC),
and U2 is the server (which generated NS).
We will next show that this NS remains secret. We
first replace ENCRYPT(KC , NS) with an encryption of
zero (but the client still decrypts it to NS). If the ad-
versary notices this, then it has broken the public-key
cipher. After this change, NS is only used as a key to
CPF. Furthermore, CPF is evaluated on NS only once by
U2 and once by U1, with a nonce NC in the other argu-
ment; if the adversary replays ENCRYPT(KC , NS), then
CPF(NS , ·) will be called with different nonces. Because
CPF is pseudorandom, we can replace its outputs ss[0]
with independent random values; if the adversary notices
this, then it has broken CPF. Continuing in this manner,
we can replace ss[i], mk[i], sid[i] and the encryption and
MAC keys with random values, and the adversary will
not notice this, either.
If the initial sequence numbers do not match, the client
and server will arrive at different (secret, random) MAC
keys, and so as long as the MAC is unforgeable, nei-
ther will accept any packets at all. Otherwise since every
packet is MACed with associated data that includes the
64-bit extended sequence number, they must be received
unmodified and in order. Finally, if the symmetric cipher
is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks, the only infor-
mation that the adversary can learn about a segment is its
length and timing. This completes the proof.
3 Integration with TCP
Integrating tcpcrypt into TCP posed a number of chal-
lenges ranging from the basic to the baroque. First, we
have to extend TCP in a backwards compatible way. If a
tcpcrypt client connects to a tcpcrypt server, encryption
should be enabled by default, but if it is a legacy server,
the session must fall back to regular TCP behavior.
The same issue applies with middleboxes. Tcpcrypt
must work through NATs, so it cannot protect the TCP
ports. Tcpcrypt must also work correctly when faced
with firewalls that do not understand the tcpcrypt exten-
sions. For an example of how broken firewalls have in-
hibited innovation, we need look no further than Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN). ECN should be harm-
less to deploy—it uses TCP options in the handshake to
negotiate the capability, then uses two bits from the old
IP Type-of-Service field to indicate congestion, and fi-
nally signals this in feedback using a previously reserved
TCP flag. ECN is built into all the main modern op-
erating systems, but is disabled by default. This is be-
cause a small number of home gateway/firewall boxes
crash when they see the reserved TCP flag set to one.
This has taught us to avoid protocol changes to TCP
that are not carried in TCP options. Firewalls might drop
unknown options, or might completely drop packets with
unknown extensions; a TCP extension needs to be robust
to either and correctly fall back to regular TCP behavior.
Finally we risk being hoisted by our own petard. Traf-
fic normalizers [9], as implemented in pf [10] and some
other firewalls, enforce conservative rules on protocol
behavior and consistency. This limits design flexibility.3
3.1 Initial TCP Handshake
Ideally the key exchange for tcpcrypt would be per-
formed in TCP’s three-way connection setup handshake,
as this would add no additional network latency to estab-
lishing encrypted sessions. We can’t quite achieve this
for the first connection between two hosts—rather, we
require adding information to the first four packets of the
session, as shown in Figure 1. To be backwards compat-
ible with regular TCP, any data we can add to the SYN
and SYN/ACK packets must fit within the TCP options
field, which is limited to 40 bytes, some of which are
required to negotiate other TCP functionality. This re-
quires HELLO and PKCONF to be small. HELLO requests
encryption; PKCONF acknowledges the use of encryption
and states the list of public key ciphers that can be used
for the subsequent key exchange. Receipt of a SYN/ACK
without PKCONF causes fallback to vanilla TCP.
The INIT1 message cannot be small, as it must contain
the client’s public key. The public key cannot fit into an
option, so instead we re-purpose the data portion of one
packet in each direction to carry it. The data payload is
only co-opted in this way after tcpcrypt negotiation has
succeeded, which ensures that key data never acciden-
tally gets passed to applications by legacy TCP stacks.
INIT2 is sent in response to INIT1 in the same way.
We use a single TCP “CRYPT” option; HELLO,
PKCONF, INIT1, and INIT2 are suboptions of CRYPT.
This reduces the use of scarce TCP option numbers, but
more importantly it ensures that if a middlebox is go-
ing to remove one option, it should remove them all.
If either host receives a TCP segment without a CRYPT
option during session establishment, tcpcrypt falls back
to vanilla TCP. This ensures interoperability with non-
tcpcrypt-aware stacks and middleboxes that strip out un-
known options. Applications can test whether tcpcrypt
is used by calling getsockopt to request the session ID,
which returns an error on downgraded connections.
Tcpcrypt also incorporates a re-keying mechanism, al-
lowing session keys to evolve later in the connection to
avoid using a single set of session keys for too long.
3.2 Session Caching
Applications such as the Web often establish more than
one TCP connection between the same pair of hosts in
rapid succession. When they do this, the amount of data
3One of us sometimes regrets writing the Normalizer paper.
transferred per connection can be quite small—often a
few KBytes. If we have to pay the full cost of running
the public key operations to establish these short-lived
sessions, tcpcrypt can become a bottleneck. Fortunately
we can use the same solution as SSL—cache the cryp-
tographic state from one TCP connection and use it to
bootstrap subsequent connections.
To do this we use two more CRYPT suboptions,
NEXTK1 and NEXTK2, also shown in Figure 1. We can-
not depend on the IP address in the SYN packet to locate
the correct state because the client may have moved, or a
different client may have acquired the DHCP lease used
by a previous client. Thus NEXTK1 contains nine bytes
of the next session ID, sid[i + 1]. This allows the server
to verify that it has the correct cached state before using
it to enable encryption. It also makes it hard for DoS at-
tackers to flush the server’s cache by spoofing packets.
In the event of a cache miss, the server returns PKCONF
and the protocol falls back to ordinary key exchange.
3.3 Protocol and Data Integrity
Unlike SSL, one of tcpcrypt’s goals is to provide in-
tegrity protection for the TCP session itself, defending
against attacks that might reset the connection [5], insert
data into it, or otherwise interfere with its progress [14].
To do this, tcpcrypt adds a MAC option to every TCP
packet after the INIT1/INIT2 exchange. Packets received
with an incorrect or missing MAC are silently dropped.
This MAC option authenticates a segment’s payload
as well as a pseudo-header comprising most of the TCP
header fields and options, as shown in Figure 2. We need
to be pragmatic about which fields are covered by the
pseudo-header. The TCP ports cannot be covered, as
NATs re-write them. The MAC option is zeroed out in
the pseudo-header, since it cannot authenticate itself.
Replay attacks could present a potential issue when
TCP’s sequence space wraps. Instead of sequence and
acknowledgment numbers, the pseudo-header contains
implicitly extended 64-bit values that cannot wrap. The
acknowledgment number is fed separately into the MAC
value, with a technique from [15], so as to improve the
efficiency of retransmissions (which often acknowledge
a different packet from the original).
Extended sequence numbers also solve the problem
that PAWS [13] was intended to solve, so an encrypted
TCP session might omit the timestamp option. This frees
up eight bytes of option space; if we use a 64-bit MAC
then tcpcrypt will use no more option space than most
modern TCP implementations. This is particularly rele-
vant for high performance, because when TCP’s window
is large it benefits from the robustness provided by Se-
lective Acknowledgments (SACK) [19], and we do not
wish to reduce their effectiveness.
src port dst port
seq no. (64-bit seq)
ack no. (64-bit ack)
d.off. flags window checksum urg. ptr.
options (e.g., SACK) MAC option
data (encrypted) IP length
Figure 2: A data packet using tcpcrypt. Dashed quanti-
ties are not transmitted by TCP though included in the
MAC, along with shaded fields.
More subtly, we need to be careful about middleboxes
that modify packets. If an implementation does send the
timestamp option, tcpcrypt will normalize it to zero in
the pseudoheader, as OpenBSD’s pf [10] modulates its
value. All the other options that are commonly modified
occur only in the SYN or SYN-ACK, so do not present
a problem. Tcpcrypt does provide a secure timestamp-
like suboption to CRYPT called SYNC. SYNC is covered
by the MAC, but fuzzes the clock to avoid the reasons
for which pf needs to modulate the timestamp’s value.
Moreover, the SYNC option is only required for keepalive
packets and during re-keying when the connection is oth-
erwise idle. In both cases there is no need for SACK
blocks, so the option space is less precious.
Packets with the TCP RST bit set present the final
challenge. For full protection, after session establish-
ment we would prefer to drop RST packets that do not
contain a valid MAC option. However, RST is TCP’s
mechanism for informing one side of a connection that
the other side no longer has any state for the connec-
tion. Under such circumstances it is impossible for a
legitimate host to generate a RST packet with the MAC
option. Tcpcrypt’s default behavior is to reset the con-
nection when receiving a RST with no MAC, so long
as it passes the OS’s sequence number validity checks.
However, some applications (notably BGP routing) have
a much stronger requirement to protect against connec-
tion resets. For these applications we support a set-
sockopt that mandates RST packets carry a valid MAC.
Such connections will take a long time to time out if one
side loses state; however, applications such as BGP and
SSH that might require such protection also typically use
application-level keepalives to detect liveness and so tear
down stale connections.
3.4 Application Awareness
Tcpcrypt serves a dual role: for legacy applications
it protects against passive eavesdroppers; for tcpcrypt-
aware applications it enables stronger protection, as we
will discuss below. However, it is important to avoid a
duplication of functionality.
Consider a tcpcrypt-aware web browser on a tcpcrypt-
capable host that wishes to make an authenticated con-
nection to a web server. The browser might prefer
tcpcrypt because of the availability of better password
authentication methods, but only if the web server also
supports it. Otherwise, it wishes to fall back to SSL.
A potential problem occurs when the client connects
to a legacy web server process running on a tcpcrypt-
capable host. Under such circumstances we do not wish
to use both unauthenticated tcpcrypt and authenticated
SSL encryption, which would be the default behavior.
Rather, the web browser wishes the tcpcrypt negotiation
in the SYN exchange to fail unless both the host and the
web server process can use the tcpcrypt-based authenti-
cation.
To get this correct fallback behavior, the HELLO option
includes a “Mandatory Application-Aware” bit. When
set, this bit indicates to the server that it must not enable
tcpcrypt encryption unless the server application has in-
formed the stack that it is tcpcrypt-aware. The process
uses a setsockopt on the listening socket to do this.
Our enhanced SSL implementation that uses this mecha-
nism is described in Section 5.3.
Tcpcrypt also includes a second “Advisory
Application-Aware” bit in both the HELLO and PKCONF
options. This is used for each side to indicate to the
other that the application is tcpcrypt-aware. This is used
when applications want to perform authentication over
tcpcrypt if the other side is also tcpcrypt-aware, but
where it is not necessary to fall back to an unencrypted
session if the other side is not tcpcrypt-aware. For
example, many websites with low security requirements
use HTTP Digest authentication. Such websites can still
use HTTP Digest authentication over tcpcrypt (though
we would not advise it), but if both the client and server
applications are tcpcrypt-aware, it would be possible
to drop in CMAC-based mutual authentication instead.
However, the client needs to know that the server can do
this before sending the HTTP request, and the “Advisory
Application-Aware” bit provides this information. It
is set via a setsockopt before calling connect and
retrieved at the other side via getsockopt after the
connection handshake completes.
4 Authentication examples
User authentication is an area in which there exist sim-
ple and well-known techniques qualitatively superior to
those in widespread use. For instance, websites typically
request passwords be sent straight to the server. As a re-
sult, we see many successful phishing attacks. Almost all
of these attacks could very easily be defeated with known
techniques, were it not for issues of backwards compat-
ibility in protocols and user interfaces. Thus, there are
strong incentives to make improvements to authentica-
tion in the web and other applications.
To realize this shift to better authentication protocols
we need innovation in user-interface design. Currently,
HTTP digest authentication, while better than plaintext
passwords, is seldom used because web developers shun
browsers’ ugly gray popup boxes. The challenge is to
allow some aesthetic control by web sites while simulta-
neously ensuring password entry is unambiguously dif-
ferentiated from web forms (or anything else accessi-
ble by JavaScript). Tcpcrypt itself obviously cannot im-
prove user interfaces; the aim is to ensure that when im-
provements do happen, they can easily be integrated with
tcpcrypt to provide security against active attackers.
The hook tcpcrypt provides to application-level au-
thentication is the session ID. This section gives a few
examples of how session IDs can be used, assuming
the ability to display certificate names and to input
passwords from a user securely. Though these exam-
ples require modifications to applications, such enhance-
ments can be deployed incrementally using tcpcrypt’s
Application-Aware bits described in the previous section.
Note that the prevalence of weak authentication makes
for some very low-hanging fruit. We do not claim these
obvious and well-known fixes as contributions. Nor do
we mean to imply that these techniques would not work
with application-layer traffic encryption were we to en-
hance SSL. Our point is merely to illustrate the general-
ity of the session ID abstraction and to help substantiate
our claim that tcpcrypt provides encryption as a general
building block suitable for a wide range of applications.
The key properties we rely on are that 1) if both ends
of a connection see the same session ID, then the ses-
sion data’s confidentiality and integrity are ensured, and
2) session IDs are unique over all time with overwhelm-
ing probability, even when one end of a connection is
malicious.
4.1 Certificate-based authentication
One common basis for server authentication is cer-
tificates, such as the X.509 certificates employed by
SSL. (This model may become even more prevalent if
DNSSEC gains widespread deployment.) In this model,
each server S has a long-lived public key, KS , certified
by a trusted authority to belong to a particular common
name and organization. The common name or organiza-
tion can then be presented to the user to inform her of
whom she is communicating with.
Certificates permit a trivial authentication protocol:
S → C : KS ,Certificate, SIGN
(
K−1S ,Session ID
)
The server simply signs the session ID, thereby proving it
owns one end of the connection, ensuring confidentiality
of messages sent by the client and integrity of those sent
by the server.
The problem with the above protocol is the cost of the
SIGN function, which can be comparable to public-key
decryption. The cost for the server to compute such a
signature for every new client would be comparable to
setting up an SSL connection, which is one of the fac-
tors dissuading people from using SSL ubiquitously to-
day. While there do exist some faster signature schemes
(e.g., [7]), the certificate authorities may not be willing
to endorse non-standard algorithms.
Fortunately, there is a better approach. Heavily loaded
servers can amortize the cost of a single signature over
many sessions by signing a batch of session IDs. Session
IDs are not secret, so disclosing a batch of them to each
client is not a problem.
Once a single session has been authenticated, the same
pair of machines can use the existing connection to boot-
strap authentication of other sessions using only sym-
metric cryptography. For instance, they can exchange
a MAC key and use it to authenticate future session IDs.
4.2 Weak password authentication
Often two connection endpoints share a secret. For in-
stance, a user may remember a password, and a server
may store some secret derived from the password. To-
day, all too often passwords simply authenticate the user
to the server and not vice versa. As a basic principle,
if we deploy new authentication mechanisms, any time
a user types a password, it should mutually authenticate
the client and server to each other. There is simply no
reason ever to use a password to authenticate only one
endpoint of a communication. Even if the other end is a
server with an X.509 certificate, the certificate may have
been fraudulently obtained, or it may be for a “typo” do-
main name similar enough to the desired one that the user
doesn’t notice the error.
When a server, S, is under severe performance con-
straints, it can perform password authentication us-
ing symmetric cryptography. For instance, S may
store the secret hash value of a user’s password, h =
H(salt, realm, password); a client C can query S for
the non-secret salt, then compute h from a user-supplied
password. Section 6 benchmarks the following trivial au-
thentication protocol for such settings:
C → S : MAC (h, TAG CLIENT||Session ID)
S → C : MAC (h, TAG SERVER||Session ID)
This protocol is no more costly or hard to implement
than digest authentication [6] (in fact, possibly easier, as
it requires no randomness beyond that already reflected
in the Session ID). Yet it provides better guarantees,
namely mutual authentication of S to C as well as in-
tegrity and confidentiality of all session data. The pro-
tocol assures both C and S that the other end of the
connection knows h. Such a guarantee is different from
and complements that provided by certificates—i.e., that
a server owns a particular domain name. Domain-name
certificates offer important protection in many contexts,
but this session-ID-based protocol offers protection even
when users do not remember the correct domain name.
We note that even if an attacker hijacks DNS to
impersonate S, our protocol is resistant to phishing
for users with good passwords. The protocol can be
viewed as endorsing the session ID with h; since ses-
sion IDs are unique over time, the attacker may obtain
MAC(h, TAG CLIENT||Session ID), but this value is mean-
ingless in the context of any other connection.
Unfortunately, while the above protocol would be cat-
egorically superior to plaintext passwords and digest au-
thentication, we still do not advocate using it except for
servers on which stronger authentication would require
too much CPU time. The problem is that an attacker who
impersonates the server to obtain the first message can
then mount an offline dictionary attack on the password,
leveraging the single message exchange to guess arbitrar-
ily many passwords. Such an attack may be detectable if
the attacker cannot crack the password in time to mount
a transparent man-in-the-middle attack—but people are
used to clicking reload sometimes when web sites fail
and will not be concerned by a single connection failure.
4.3 Strong password authentication
Fortunately, as detailed in Section 6, any site that can af-
ford to use SSL today can afford to use a strong pass-
word authentication scheme with tcpcrypt. Here we
give a simple example of a Password-Authenticated Key-
Exchange (PAKE) protocol that that, while considerably
more expensive than the previous weak protocol, can
nonetheless be implemented with far less overhead than
SSL imposes today.
We use a protocol termed PAKE+2 in [4]. The proto-
col relies on several system-wide parameter choices: a
group G of prime order q (on which the computational
Diffie Hellman problem is hard); a generator g ofG; two
randomly-chosen elements of G, U and V ; two crypto-
graphic hash functions, H0 and H1, mapping strings to
elements of Zq; and finally, another hash function, H ,
onto bit strings the size of a MAC key. At the time a user
registers for an account, her client computes:
π0 = H0(password, user name, server name)
π1 = H1(password, user name, server name)
L = gpi1
The server stores π0 and L, but never sees π1. To au-
thenticate a session, the client chooses a random ele-
ment α ∈ Zq and the server chooses a random element
β ∈ Zq. The two then engage in the following protocol:
C → S : gαUpi0
S → C : gβV pi0
At this point, both sides compute gαβ . They can do this
by computing either U−pi0 or V −pi0 and using it to re-
vert to a regular Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Then
both sides compute gpi1β . The client can do this because
it knows gβ and π1. The server can do this because it
knows: L = gpi1 and β. Finally, both sides compute:
h = H
(
π0, g
α, bβ , gαβ , gpi1β
)
Using h they complete the password authentication pro-
tocol of the previous section, but now the order of mes-
sages doesn’t matter (the client and server can each trans-
mit one of these messages before receiving the other to
reduce latency):
S → C : MAC (h, TAG SERVER||Session ID)
C → S : MAC (h, TAG CLIENT||Session ID)
While this protocol is considerably more expensive
than the one in the previous section, it has the benefit of
protecting users with weak passwords; each guess at the
password requires a separate network interaction with a
party that knows either the password or π0 and L. More-
over, the protocol is still cheaper than SSL (even com-
bined with tcpcrypt key negotiation). Therefore, we be-
lieve it is suitable for use in any application that uses both
passwords and SSL.
It is an open question whether we can design pass-
word authentication protocols that are highly efficient
at the server and offload most of the work to the
client. However, should we devise such protocols, they
can be deployed after the fact, without modification to
tcpcrypt itself. The session ID abstraction nicely sepa-
rates tcpcrypt’s confidentiality and integrity properties,
which are solved problems, from authentication, where
further innovation may be needed.
5 Implementation
To validate the protocol design and verify its perfor-
mance, we implemented tcpcrypt in the Linux kernel.
We also implemented tcpcrypt as a user-space daemon
using divert sockets; this allows tcpcrypt to be deployed
easily without requiring any kernel changes. Finally we
implemented a range of application authentication mech-
anisms over tcpcrypt.
5.1 Linux kernel implementation
Our kernel implementation of tcpcrypt consists of a
4,000-line loadable module and 70 lines added to the
core Linux 2.6.32 kernel to add the necessary hooks. For
RSA support, we ported OpenSSL v0.9.8l to the Linux
kernel. This required about 400 lines of glue code to ex-
port RSA as a Linux crypto module. We also exposed
OpenSSL’s SHA1 as we found it to perform twice as fast
as Linux’s implementation.
During the implementation, it became clear that
tcpcrypt is incompatible with TCP segmentation offload-
ing, as supported in some modern NICs. As tcpcrypt
has to copy the packet to memory to encrypt the data
and compute the MAC, segmenting it during this process
does not add significant overhead. However, a server
running so close to its performance limits that it re-
quires segmentation offloading would likely want to dis-
able tcpcrypt.
5.2 Portable userspace implementation
Our userspace tcpcrypt implementation uses divert sock-
ets to access TCP packets entering and leaving the host.
Firewall rules select the packets to be diverted, leaving
the kernel unchanged. FreeBSD’s NAT (natd) is im-
plemented this way. The main advantages of this ap-
proach are portability and ease of deployment. Our code
is 7,000 lines. We have tested it on MacOS X, FreeBSD
and Linux.
The userspace implementation is obviously slower
than the native kernel implementation, but it is ideal for
early deployment without support from OS vendors. If
tcpcrypt is successful and ships in major operating sys-
tems, it will still be a long time before older hosts are up-
graded. The userspace implementation provides a good
interim solution. It can also be run on middleboxes such
as firewalls or home gateways to protect traffic to and
from legacy local hosts against passive eavesdropping.
The userspace implementation is more complicated
than the kernel one as it must track connections, dupli-
cate much of TCP’s state machine, calculate checksums
again, and rewrite sequence and acknowledgment num-
bers since we use some bytes of the payload for INIT
messages. In SYNs the MSS is reduced to allow space
to add the MAC to subsequent packets. In addition, the
sending of application data must be delayed until the
tcpcrypt handshake completes, which we do by modulat-
ing the receive window. Finally, we implement IPC calls
to provide the equivalent of getsockopt, so the applica-
tion can extract the session ID to perform authentication.
5.3 Integrating tcpcrypt and OpenSSL
If tcpcrypt were enabled by default, then an SSL con-
nection between two tcpcrypt hosts would duplicate ef-
fort doing both tcpcrypt and SSL key exchange and en-
cryption. Tcpcrypt’s Mandatory Application-Aware bit
avoids this duplication. To verify this mechanism and to
compare the full performance of Apache running SSL-
over-tcpcrypt using batch-signing to that of vanilla SSL,
we implemented tcpcrypt support within the OpenSSL
v0.9.81e library. We did not modify OpenSSL’s API or
require applications to set specific parameters to gain the
benefits of tcpcrypt and batch-signing—our library is a
drop-in replacement for OpenSSL.
Our implementation uses the tcpcrypt setsockopt to
notify the kernel that the application supports tcpcrypt,
setting the Mandatory Application-Aware bit during the
handshake. After the TCP handshake, either the session
is encrypted and both sides support tcpcrypt-based au-
thentication, or the connection has fallen back to vanilla
TCP. The library code then queries with getsockopt to
get the session ID. If this returns an error, it falls back to
SSL’s handshake, otherwise it batch-signs the session ID
and sends it to the client.
We modified OpenSSL’s BIO layer to call the neces-
sary setsockopt for setting the application bit. The
SSL layer, i.e., SSL accept and SSL connect, then
deals with the signatures. Thus, so long as the appli-
cation uses the BIO API, no change to the application
is needed to use tcpcrypt-based authentication instead of
SSL authentication.
Things are not quite so clean if application program-
mers manually create sockets using the BSD socket APIs
instead of BIO, feeding them directly into SSL accept
and SSL connect. These sockets will not have the nec-
essary options set, and so tcpcrypt would disable itself
even though the SSL library is capable. In such cases, if
upgrading the application is not possible, then a sysctl
could be used to set the application bit on by default on
specific TCP ports.
Batch signing is implemented per SSL context. A
single worker thread (per SSL context) waits on a
semaphore for work and batch signs all session IDs it
finds on its work queue. The signer thread then wakes
up all threads corresponding to the session IDs signed.
For batch signing to work, the SSL server must be mul-
tithreaded. We note that this implementation naturally
scales depending on load: if a single client needs a sig-
nature, it is produced right away; when under load, mul-
tiple client session IDs will be batch signed to amortize
cost. Our OpenSSL patch and batch signing code total
700 lines of code.
5.4 Password based authentication
We implemented the weak password authentication
scheme in Section 4.2 as well as the strong scheme from
Section 4.3. The weak scheme uses CMAC-AES as
the MAC, and employs IBM’s CMAC patch [21] for
OpenSSL. We implemented the strong authentication
scheme ourselves (500 lines of code) using OpenSSL’s
built-in support for NIST Prime-Curve P-256.
6 Performance and compatibility
If we are to achieve our ultimate goal of encrypting al-
most all Internet traffic, then the cost of doing so must
be sufficiently low that the cost/benefit trade-off makes
sense, even when the benefits are small. What then are
the costs of running tcpcrypt? Roughly, the performance
cost breaks down as follows:
• The cost of the tcpcrypt key exchange.
• The cost of encrypting and MACing every packet
on the wire.
• The cost of authentication over tcpcrypt, for appli-
cations that choose to authenticate.
We must demonstrate that the first two are small enough
they will not significantly degrade the performance of
the vast majority of servers (clients are rarely the bottle-
neck, as they handle only a few connections per second
at most). We must also demonstrate that the third is at
least as cheap as current deployed solutions.
In addition, we must also demonstrate compatibility.
Tcpcrypt must not cause connections to fail that would
succeed without tcpcrypt.
6.1 Connection setup rate
Just how fast do servers need to accept connections in
practice? It is hard to get firm numbers. YouTube gets
1 billion hits per day [12], thus averaging about 11,500
hits per second. Facebook currently gets about 260 bil-
lion page views per month [20], or around 100,000 per
second. Of course a page may require more than one
TCP connection, but with HTTP/1.1 the number will be
fairly small. Facebook also has over 30,000 servers [24].
Not all these are front-end servers, but even so it becomes
clear that the number of connections that need to be han-
dled per second on each server is unlikely to be more
than a few thousand.
To get another perspective, we can examine what an
untuned operating system running an untuned web server
can achieve. This tells us how default configurations per-
form, and so what a typical server administrator might
expect. Our test machines are eight-core (two Intel Xeon
X5355 CPUs) running Linux 2.6.32. Each has 13 1Gb/s
NICs connected to client hosts via a LAN. Multiple
clients and parallel connections are needed to saturate the
server. Untuned, these servers can handle 35,500 TCP
connections per second in a simple connection setup and
teardown test, or 28,400 connections per second running
Apache serving a small static file.
To determine the effect of tcpcrypt, first we need a
better control experiment because the untuned numbers
above, although typical of most real-world installations,
fail to fully utilize the machine, leaving some idle time. It
took considerable tuning4 to get the connection setup and
teardown test to saturate all the cores. Such a setup is not
realistic for normal operation, but we wish to compare
against the best-case vanilla TCP, not one that leaves un-
used CPU cycles. We will compare this optimized TCP
against SSL and tcpcrypt.
We expect tcpcrypt to slow down TCP’s connection
throughput in two main ways. First, uncached tcpcrypt
connections use public key operations to setup a connec-
tion. This cost is predominantly born by clients, which
perform the more expensive RSA decryption operation.
We use 2048-bit RSA-3 keys in all benchmarks.
Second, packets are MACed and thus require more
CPU cycles and memory accesses. Even with connec-
tion caching, which avoids the need for public key ci-
pher operations, four out of six of the packets in an
accept/close cycle are MACed (two ACKs and two
FINs). We therefore expect a performance degrada-
tion both in the uncached and cached connection cases,
though uncached connections will be more expensive.
We expect SSL to perform less well than tcpcrypt for
two reasons. First, it requires more RTTs to complete a
connection because SSL’s handshake can only start after
TCP’s handshake. More notably, uncached SSL connec-
tions should be much slower than tcpcrypt’s because an
SSL server performs the more expensive RSA decryption
operation. However SSL also authenticates the server, so
this is not an apples-to-apples comparison. We shall ex-
amine the cost of tcpcrypt’s authentication in Section 6.2.
Connection rate (conn/s)
Protocol Native Divert
TCP server 98,434 61,515
tcpcrypt server (cached) 70,044 38,832
tcpcrypt server (uncached) 27,070 21,908
SSL server (cached) 39,785 27,348
SSL server (uncached) 754 743
tcpcrypt client (uncached) 794 749
Table 1: Connection setup rate of tcpcrypt.
Table 1 shows the results. Both the cached case (same
client reconnecting) and uncached case (new client, re-
quiring public key cipher operations) are shown. The
two columns benchmark our two tcpcrypt implementa-
tions: the kernel one (“Native”) and the userspace divert
socket one. To get divert numbers for TCP and SSL,
4This involved running multiple instances of the benchmark on dif-
ferent ports to avoid kernel locks on accept. We set the affinity of
each benchmark to one CPU, and used a different NIC per benchmark,
with the NIC’s interrupt affinity set to the same CPU as the benchmark
using the NIC. This resolved in optimal packet scheduling and load
balancing that finally brought the system to zero idle time.
we divert all traffic to userspace and back to the ker-
nel; although this isn’t useful, it allows us to separate
out the different costs and see the overhead of the divert
socket separately from additional protocol mechanism in
the tcpcrypt userspace implementation.
Tcpcrypt outperforms SSL in the uncached case by a
large margin due to reversing the asymmetric RSA costs;
the client bears this cost. Tcpcrypt’s cached performance
is also better than SSL. We note that our kernel im-
plementation is not fully optimized, so it may well be
possible to get even greater performance. For example,
we could encrypt and MAC data while copying it from
userspace rather than doing it on a later pass. This would
be an optimization similar to that for checksum calcula-
tion already used in Linux.
While TCP can be up to 41% faster for cached con-
nections and 3.6× faster for uncached ones, we believe
that the absolute performance numbers of tcpcrypt have
their own merit. Recall that a heavily loaded website
like Youtube averages 11,500 connections per second
and tcpcrypt should be able to sustain such high load.
Also recall that our untuned default configuration server
can only handle 35,500 connections running the same
benchmark of Table 1, also a target that tcpcrypt can meet
if some sessions are cached.
The divert socket implementation is slower than our
kernel one due to the multiple copies needed for each
packet, from the kernel to userspace, and then back to
the kernel. Furthermore the userspace implementation
needs to (wastefully) duplicate TCP functionality already
present in the kernel such as checksum calculations and
protocol control block lookups. However, we believe that
the absolute performance numbers of our divert socket
implementation are sufficient for many situations, espe-
cially on clients, where simple installation may be a pri-
ority over performance.
6.2 Authenticated connection setup rate
While Table 1 included SSL as a reference point, it can-
not be used to directly compare the two systems be-
cause SSL performs authentication by default and thus
is stronger than unauthenticated tcpcrypt. As tcpcrypt
leaves authentication to applications, we are free to ex-
amine different authentication schemes. Our authentica-
tion benchmarks cover: tcpcrypt with batch signing (SSL
replacement), CMAC password-based mutual authenti-
cation (vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks), batch
signing combined with CMAC, and PAKE+2 password-
based mutual authentication (both resistant to offline dic-
tionary attacks). The benchmark and setup is identical
to our previous benchmark, but with added application-
level authentication after connection setup. We expect
tcpcrypt with batch signing to outperform SSL when
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Figure 3: tcpcrypt’s authenticated connection setup rate.
batching more than one request, as RSA signatures will
be amortized. We expect CMAC to outperform RSA-
based authentication, because it uses symmetric cryptog-
raphy only. Our PAKE implementation is so far unop-
timized, but even so we expect it to be faster than RSA
because it replaces the expensive RSA signature with a
few elliptic-curve operations.
Figure 3 shows tcpcrypt’s authenticated connection
setup rate when using our kernel implementation (“Na-
tive”) and our userspace divert socket one. Batch signing
performs differently depending on the size of the batch
and Figure 3(b) shows how this scales. Most of the ben-
efits of batch signing arise even with a parameter as low
as 100, a number of concurrent clients easily reached
when the server is under load. Figure 3(a) clearly shows
that there is a range of performance characteristics which
applications may choose from. With SSL instead, ap-
plications are forced to use relatively low performance
one-way authentication. Clearly, one size does not fit all.
With tcpcrypt, applications can choose any combination
of one-way or two-way authentication and higher perfor-
mance at lower security or lower performance at higher
security. For example, a busy web forum might choose
CMAC for its authentication as it requires two-way au-
thentication and high performance, but perhaps is not so
security-critical that it needs to thwart offline dictionary
Connect time (ms)
Protocol LAN WAN
TCP 0.2 105
Tcpcrypt cached 0.3 103
Tcpcrypt not cached 11.3 219
Tcpcrypt CMAC 11.4 320
Tcpcrypt PAKE 15.2 426
SSL cached 0.7 210
SSL not cached 11.6 321
Table 2: Connection setup time.
attacks. This setup would perform 36x faster than SSL
on uncached connections, providing stronger (two-way)
authentication. A bank instead, might choose PAKE for
its authentication, performing slower, but still twice as
fast as SSL. Alternatively if a certificate is available,
signing plus CMAC could be 24x faster than SSL and
still resist offline dictionary attacks. A site requiring only
one-way authentication, like a checkout from an online
shop that does not require login, can perform up to 26x
faster than SSL when loaded and handling over 150 con-
current requests. Tcpcrypt with batch signing is therefore
a viable drop-in replacement for SSL, as in all cases its
connection setup performance is superior (we shall ex-
amine data throughput in Section 6.4). Authentication
adds little cost to tcpcrypt: 2% penalty with CMAC or
28% with batch signing under load. We believe this per-
formance to be practical for many servers.
For most clients the performance of the divert socket
implementation will be sufficient, providing an easily in-
stalled alternative.
Hardware is often used to offload expensive public key
cryptography. For example, Sun’s UltraSPARC T1 has
a Modular Arithmetic Unit for RSA, and can do 2,300
2048-bit signatures per second using all 32 cores [18].
Tcpcrypt outperforms this using only eight general pur-
pose cores, showing how careful protocol design can
avoid the need to throw hardware (and money) at the
problem. We argue that offloading asymmetric encryp-
tion is no longer needed for network encryption.
6.3 Connection latency
Throughput is not the only important metric—
connection setup latency is also important. We
compare the connection setup time from the client’s
point of view for TCP, SSL and tcpcrypt. We expect
tcpcrypt to setup connections faster than SSL because
tcpcrypt’s handshake requires fewer round trips. Table 2
shows the time to establish a connection on a LAN
(0.2ms RTT) and on a WAN (100ms RTT).
When the connection is cached, tcpcrypt adds very
little delay to TCP because no extra RTTs are needed.
Tcpcrypt does extra work to advance keys and MAC
the ACK, hence it takes fractionally longer. SSL
cached takes considerably longer because its negotiation
can only start after TCP’s handshake finishes whereas
tcpcrypt uses the three-way handshake. In the non-
cached case tcpcrypt and SSL perform similarly on the
LAN as RSA dominates the cost. The main difference
is that tcpcrypt is client-limited whereas SSL is server-
limited. On the WAN, RTT dominates; tcpcrypt costs
one RTT more than TCP, but one RTT less than SSL as
it needs fewer messages to complete the handshake. Au-
thenticating an uncached tcpcrypt connection, for exam-
ple using CMAC or PAKE, adds extra latency.
With batch-signing there might be a concern that the
queuing of requests to be signed might add extra latency.
In fact this is not the case—our implementation signs
whatever queue is available as fast as it can. Even the fact
that tcpcrypt with signing requires two RSA operations
does not add to latency—the expensive decrypt operation
on the client takes place in parallel with the sign opera-
tion on the server, so negligible extra latency is required
beyond the extra RTT needed for authentication.
The main effect of batch signing is in fact to reduce la-
tency as the server becomes loaded. This is shown in Fig-
ure 4, which graphs connection latency against the num-
ber of connections per second the server handles. As the
load increases eventually the server saturates and the la-
tency increases extremely rapidly. The figure shows SSL
latency and tcpcrypt latency when the maximum batch
size has been artificially limited to 1, 5 and 10. SSL and
tcpcrypt with a batch size of one are indistinguishable on
this graph, so we only plot one line. It is clear that when
the server has CPU cycles to spare, the batch size has
no adverse effect on latency. In fact, quite the reverse—
batching reduces the variance (the plot shows 10th and
90th percentiles as error bars), because short-term varia-
tions in arrival rate map into variation in batch size rather
than variation in CPU load. More importantly, allowing
larger batch sizes allows the server to saturate much later,
and so maintain this low latency across a much wider
range of server workloads.
6.4 Data transfer rates
We now account for the cost of symmetric encryption
and determine the maximum data throughput one can ex-
pect with tcpcrypt. We benchmark data throughput when
transmitted with TCP, tcpcrypt and SSL. To fully satu-
rate the CPU we ran one benchmark program per core
and NIC pair, setting the affinity of the benchmark and
NIC to a particular core. Otherwise, packet scheduling
was suboptimal resulting in idle time. We expect SSL
and tcpcrypt performance to be similar as both are do-
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Transfer Throughput (Mbit/s)
Protocol Native Divert
TCP 12,954+ 3,357
tcpcrypt AES-SHA1 3,968 1,752
SSL AES-SHA1 3,692 1,939
Table 3: tcpcrypt’s data throughput.
ing AES128 and HMAC-SHA1. Obviously, vanilla TCP
will be fastest as it need not encrypt or MAC.
Table 3 shows the data throughput of tcpcrypt, for our
kernel implementation (“Native”) and our userspace di-
vert socket one. We were unable to saturate the CPU
on the TCP benchmark (11% idle time) as we saturated
all available NICs on the server. Tcpcrypt outperforms
SSL by 7.4%. This was unexpected as the two essen-
tially perform the same tasks: AES and SHA1. We are
using different implementations for AES (Linux’s ker-
nel vs. OpenSSL) though we found the two to perform
similarly when benchmarked individually. The funda-
mental differences between tcpcrypt and SSL are that
SSL must do its own data segmentation and encapsula-
tion (in addition to TCP’s) thus needs more work than
tcpcrypt. SSL MACs at a message boundary which
can span multiple packets, whereas tcpcrypt must MAC
once per packet. Tcpcrypt is MACing slightly more data
as it includes packet headers, though the cost of SSL’s
message encapsulation seems to outweigh the additional
bytes MACed by tcpcrypt. Overall, however, CPUs are
powerful enough to fully encrypt a one Gigabit link, and
in fact even more. Client machines seldom have more ca-
pacity than that, and even our userspace implementation
provides sufficient performance for those cases.
Most relevant to servers, higher rates are possible
by using faster ciphers and MACs; tcpcrypt achieves
7,486Mbit/s using Salsa20/12 and UMAC. High-speed
AES is possible too now that AES-enhanced CPUs are
becoming ubiquitous, like Intel’s Westmere CPU [8],
Sun’s UltraSPARC T2 [2] and VIA’s processors [1]. On
a dual-core 3.33GHz desktop i5 with a 10Gb/s NIC,
Apache, static content (req/s)
Protocol Native Divert
TCP 60,156 27,196
tcpcrypt (cached) 42,440 20,034
tcpcrypt (uncached) 19,153 14,215
SSL (cached) 19,787 12,063
SSL (uncached) 737 705
Table 4: Apache performance serving static content.
tcpcrypt performed 8,835Mbit/s using AES-UMAC,
even without TCP segmentation offloading and optimiza-
tions in tcpcrypt. As an experiment, we were able to
saturate 10Gb/s by using jumbo frames or by overclock-
ing the box to 3.75GHz. We thus soon expect CPUs that
will permit 10Gig AES networking—in fact, this is likely
possible today if a six-core server i5 is used.
6.5 Application performance: Apache
We now study the overhead of tcpcrypt when used in a
real application. We test the Apache web server (v2.2.11)
serving a 44 byte static file. This setup has low ap-
plication overhead, emphasizing overhead imposed by
the networking stack. With a default configuration, our
server can handle 28,400 requests per second though the
CPUs remain unsaturated. To fully saturate CPUs, we
must run multiple Apache instances, each on a different
TCP port, serving traffic on a different NIC. Based on
our microbenchmarks, we expect tcpcrypt to outperform
SSL and have lower performance than TCP. We do not
perform any authentication on this tcpcrypt benchmark,
so SSL provides stronger guarantees in this case. How-
ever, as discussed earlier, authentication can be added to
tcpcrypt at a relatively low cost if needed.
Table 4 shows the results of our Apache benchmark.
Because real-world web traffic is a mix of new and re-
turning clients, connection setup can quickly become a
bottleneck for SSL. Tcpcrypt, on the other hand, main-
tains a high connection rate (31% of native TCP) even
for new clients. Note also that the case of small, static
files is a worst-case benchmark for connection setup. We
tried benchmarking WordPress, a more CPU-intensive
application. Neither tcpcrypt nor SSL caused a measur-
able slowdown. This test demonstrates that ubiquitous
encryption is feasible when the application is the bottle-
neck, and in most cases even if it is not.
6.6 Compatibility
Incremental deployment is one of our chief goals. Es-
sentially this entails gracefully falling back to TCP so
that connections are guaranteed to succeed. Users will
not enable tcpcrypt if doing causes their connections to
fail. Tcpcrypt falls back gracefully so long as packets
with the CRYPT option do not get dropped. Otherwise,
tcpcrypt might indefinitely send SYN packets with the
CRYPT option, and the connection would fail when it
would succeed using a virgin SYN packet. To gauge
whether this is a problem, we initiated tcpcrypt connec-
tions to the top 10,000 sites listed on Alexa. Specifically,
we sent a SYN with the CRYPT-HELLO option set, ex-
pecting to get a SYN-ACK back. If not, we considered
the packet dropped. We retransmitted SYNs to detect
packet loss. This gives a rough estimate of how many
connections would fail because of tcpcrypt.
Of the Alexa top 10,000 sites, we found 15 (0.015%)
that did not respond with a SYN-ACK to a tcpcrypt SYN.
Of these, three were on the same network. Given such a
low failure rate, we are optimistic that tcpcrypt will work
most of the time and can be safely deployed. However,
by default, tcpcrypt will try to revert to standard TCP in
case it does not receive a SYN-ACK after sending a few
tcpcrypt SYNs to ensure reachability.
We do not expect tcpcrypt to suffer ECN’s fate in
terms of compatibility. ECN used reserved bits in the
TCP header which would trigger IDSs and cause unde-
fined behavior. Instead, tcpcrypt uses options as dic-
tated by TCP’s specification and is not anomalous in
any way—for instance, even during re-keying the proto-
col design ensures that retransmissions always produce
the same payload bytes for a given range of sequence
numbers. We thus believe that tcpcrypt can safely be
deployed on today’s Internet as it will, for the majority
of users, provide stronger security without breaking con-
nections or noticeably reducing performance.
7 Related work
We categorize related work based on the networking
stack layer it operates in. The network layer is domi-
nated by IPSec-based solutions. IPSec [16] encrypts all
data above the network layer. However, IPSec has not
enjoyed widespread deployment and use, so a reasonable
fear is that tcpcrypt could endure the same fate. Fortu-
nately, several factors make it easier to deploy tcpcrypt
and provide greater incentive to do so, leaving us some
hope that ubiquitous encryption can succeed at the trans-
port layer even if it has not at the network layer.
A big challenge to IPSec is that it breaks middleboxes
that require access to the transport layer. Given the in-
creasing prevalence of NAT in particular, this excludes
a large portion of the population from using IPSec.
Tcpcrypt, by contrast, operates at the transport layer and
so avoids these problems. Another challenge for IPSec
is that it is hard to create a notion of a “session” in a
connection-less environment (the network layer). Thus,
while IPSec is good at authenticating hosts to one an-
other for purposes such as virtual private networks, it
would be difficult and cumbersome to authenticate indi-
vidual users, processes, and connections between hosts.
Moreover, some transport-level security issues, such as
protecting against wrapped acknowledgment numbers,
are harder to reason about in IPSec.
Conversely, there are several incentives for deploying
tcpcrypt that have no analogue with IPSec. One is that it
can be integrated in a backwards-compatible way with
SSL and significantly increase performance. By con-
trast, SSL over IPSec would require double-encryption,
reducing performance. Second, TCPmultipath requires a
means of authenticating the same endpoint with multiple
IP addresses, which tcpcrypt makes much easier. That
said, tcpcrypt is less general than IPSec, which encrypts
everything above IP, including UDP.
Better Than Nothing Security (BTNS) [26] is IPSec
without a PKI, thus providing no security guarantees
against active attackers. This is similar to default
tcpcrypt. However, tcpcrypt additionally exposes the
necessary hooks so that applications can perform au-
thenticate in a variety of ways to guarantee security.
Opportunistic encryption using IKE [23] specifies how
to use IPSec with certificates obtained from DNSSEC.
Tcpcrypt would need application support to integrate
with DNSSEC.
We found no privacy solutions integrated into the
transport layer. There are, however, integrity solutions.
TCP MD5 [11] and AO [27] provide authentication and
integrity protection within TCP. Tcpcrypt provides more
functionality than these options by providing encryption.
Moreover, tcpcrypt is fundamentally different as it re-
quires no user setup. The session is established using
ephemeral keys, and authentication can happen over the
session itself. TCP MD5 and AO require establishing
pre-shared secrets through out-of-band means. The main
use of TCP MD5 and AO is to protect manually con-
figured BGP sessions, which tcpcrypt can do as well by
disabling unauthenticated RST packets. Also, TCP AO
does not interoperate with NATs (which is okay for its in-
tended use, as BGP is not usually spoken through NATs).
The dominant encryption solution above the transport
layer is SSL [22]. Tcpcrypt offers a number of bene-
fits over SSL, including better server performance, in-
trinsic forward secrecy, and integrity protection for the
TCP session itself. Tcpcrypt is also more general, as it
supports arbitrary authentication mechanisms and does
not require a PKI. Finally, tcpcrypt is backward com-
patible with legacy applications and legacy hosts, which
should ease ubiquitous deployment. Being more general,
tcpcrypt can be used as a drop-in replacement for SSL,
and we have in fact produced an SSL library that falls
back to SSL if tcpcrypt is unavailable.
ObsTCP [17] also aims to provide opportunistic en-
cryption, but is only designed to provide security in ag-
gregate, not for specifically targeted connections. The
author states, “We continue to advocate TLS as the only
user facing transport security,” meaning ObsTCP will
duplicate encryption done by TLS, not protect transport
headers, and not integrate with application-level authen-
tication. ObsTCP requires no new TCP options and no
extra round trips for connection setup, but the downside
is that applications must be modified and that the first
connection between two hosts remains unencrypted un-
less one knows that the other supports ObsTCP.
While tcpcrypt combines only well-known techniques,
no other existing protocol can accomplish all of its
goals. Specifically, tcpcrypt can be incrementally de-
ployed on today’s Internet, works out-of-the-box (even
through NATs) without manual configuration, provides
high enough performance to be on by default, and allows
applications to integrate transport-layer security with ar-
bitrary higher-level authentication techniques. The Inter-
net demands higher security, hardware is ready for it, and
the cryptographic techniques were waiting to be pieced
together; tcpcrypt does so, and we believe our evaluation
shows it could be readily deployed.
8 Conclusion
Tcpcrypt demonstrates that ubiquitous encryption of
TCP traffic is technically feasible on modern hardware.
By leveraging the asymmetry of common public key ci-
phers, it is possible for a server to accept and service
around 20,000 tcpcrypt connections per second without
session caching. Even higher rates are possible with
caching. Data transfer rates are not an issue either; AES-
SHA1 encryption and integrity protection can be done at
several gigabits per second without hardware support on
2008-era hardware. The newest Intel CPUs incorporat-
ing AES instructions are even faster—tcpcrypt can reach
9Gb/s using AES-UMAC on a dual-core i5 desktop, sug-
gesting that six-core i5 servers should handle 10Gb/s.
These results suggest that tcpcrypt should have a neg-
ligible impact on the vast majority of applications.
The main contribution of this work is not performance,
though this is a prerequisite. There are no new crypto-
graphic primitives, nor is the protocol especially novel.
The main contribution is from putting well-understood
components together in the right way to permit rapid and
universal deployment of opportunistic encryption, and
then providing the right hooks to encourage innovation
and deployment of much better and more appropriate
application-level authentication. This ability to integrate
transport-layer security with application-level authenti-
cation largely obviates the need for applications to en-
crypt their own network traffic, thereby minimizing du-
plication of functionality.
As an example, we showed how a simple batch-
signing server-authentication scheme can leverage
tcpcrypt to provide forward secrecy and the same se-
curity as SSL while handling 25 times the connections
per second. At the same time, the protocol allows an
SSL server to fall back gracefully to regular SSL behav-
ior when one or the other side cannot utilize tcpcrypt for
authentication.
We also demonstrated the use of tcpcrypt to bootstrap
both weak and strong password-based mutual authentica-
tion (using CMAC and PAKE respectively). Password-
based authentication without mutual authentication, even
over SSL, really should be a thing of the past. Using
tcpcrypt with batch signing and CMAC mutual authenti-
cation is strictly stronger than HTTP Digest authentica-
tion over an SSL session, and more than 20 times faster.
Using tcpcrypt and our unoptimized PAKE implementa-
tion is almost twice as fast as SSL, and provides stronger
security. Many other authentication mechanisms are pos-
sible; we believe that tcpcrypt’s generality and simple
application-level hooks are exactly what is required to
get application writers to think about the form of authen-
tication they really need, once they can address authen-
tication separately from the question of how to encrypt
session data.
Finally, tcpcrypt interoperates seamlessly with legacy
applications, TCP stacks, and middleboxes, making it
easy to deploy incrementally. For all of the above
reasons, we believe that it now makes sense to make
transport-layer encryption the default. Make it happen
by installing tcpcrypt from http://tcpcrypt.org.
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